Campari Group: The Perfect Serve BUY @ €6.96

Campari - View All Notes and Models

Analyst: Julien Baux T: +44 20 3744 5843 E: julienbaux@theanalyst.co.uk



| Recommendation: Buy (Initiation of Coverage) | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|--|--|
| Price: €6.96 | 2-Year Price Target: €11.59 | Forecast Return: ~66% | | | |
| 3m Average Daily Volume: \$54.6m | Market Cap: €7.8bn | Ticker: CPR IM | | | |
| Valuation Metric: FY'23e P/E | Current Multiple: 18.2x | Target Multiple: 30x | | | |

Investment Thesis

- Family-owned Italian gem managed with a multi-decade view. Combines unique, global growth products with pricing power, high margins, and structural demand.
- Mid-single-digit group revenue growth can accelerate as consumption of key product Aperol continues to explode around the world.
- Growth is highly accretive to group profitability due to Aperol's higher gross margins.

- Other brands in the portfolio provide exposure to key spirits categories, offering both further growth optionality and potential margin upside thanks to structural demand trends, brand internationalisation, and premiumisation.
- 30x FY'23e EPS and adding two years of dividends gives a target price of €11.59, representing ~66% upside. .

Campari Group has been on our wish list for a long time. Today, it moves to our buy list. We initiate with a Buy recommendation and a €11.59 target price, representing ~66% upside.

We met the company in Italy in the past and looked again in mid-2018. Each time, at much lower share prices than today, we concluded that valuation was prohibitive for us to add the stock to our buy list. However, with the passage of time, we have come to understand that fundamentals and growth consistently outweigh valuation and the best companies rarely get 'cheap'. Clients may still push back on valuation concerns, but the broader environment remains one of extremely low interest rates, whilst Campari has great long-term earnings and growth visibility.

We argue Campari is one of the best companies in Europe, delivering unique products with global growth runway, pricing power, high margins, and structural demand. Campari's 'secret sauce' relies on a business model focused on brand-building and a long-term planning strategy backed by very patient shareholders.

The key elements of our thesis are:

- Aperol has a long runway of high growth ahead as the brand has barely scratched the surface of its huge global potential. This is underpinned by product uniqueness, structural demand, and a significant 'share of throat' gain available. We estimate Aperol sales growth at ~21% CAGR 2019-23e, reaching €720m by FY'23e. Growth is highly accretive to profitability as Aperol is higher gross margin than the group and it is accelerating its market penetration in higher-margin countries.
- Other brands in the portfolio such as Campari, Wild Turkey, and Appleton Estate offer exposure to growing spirits categories and are set to benefit from shrewd bottom-up marketing, brand internationalisation, and premiumisation positioning. We see both growth optionality and margin upside which we think are currently overlooked by the market.
- Overall, we estimate the group revenue growth will accelerate after FY'20 to low-double-digit with gross margin increasing from 60.9% in FY'19 to 62.5% in FY'23e.
- We estimate that the business can generate cumulative free cash flows (after earn-outs) of ~€590m by FY'22e. We expect additional capital returns to shareholders after the announced €350m share buyback in FY'20. However, M&A represents additional optionality as the group has been a canny acquirer in the past.



Campari Group has a lot of the characteristics of a great business which can compound and create value for investors over decades. The stock is down ~25% since its pre-COVID-19 high. The current uncertainty offers a good opportunity to build up a position for the long term in one of the best-run business in Europe.

Aperol: Still a Long Runway of Explosive Growth Ahead

Three-Stage Sustainable Growth Model at the Heart of the Brand-Building Strategy

When it comes to market penetration and brand building, the company's strategy relies on a three-phase product roll-out plan spanning 15+ years. Along the way, the group controls the pace of the roll-out thanks to its direct distribution approach and maintains strict control of the brand image. Local management teams spend a lot of time understanding the consumer, training barmen, and tweaking their marketing approach. **Once the bottom-up marketing model kicks off, the brand starts growing rapidly**.

Phase 1 (Year 1-7): The company targets specific cities/bars focusing on educating the market and training bartenders on the perfect serve. In the early stage, sales are mainly on-trade and the gross margin is fully reinvested in advertising and promotion. The brand building is driven by experimental marketing such as social events organised by Campari's employees and the product is slowly released off-premise (90% on-trade/10% off-trade).

Once the market is educated on how to use Aperol and brand awareness grows, the company starts to grow off-trade and continues investing in education, but now start to grow EBIT margin.

Phase 2 (Year 8-13): During this second phase, the strategy is to de-seasonalise Aperol into the winter and build consumption frequency beyond the summer, more similar to beer consumption. The brand-building continues through winter events (e.g. winter sports, après-ski parties). At this stage, the product is fully released off-premise as consumers are more familiar with the brand.

Phase 3 (Year 14+): The focus is on increasing consumption outside of pre-dinner aperitifs with food pairing (e.g. pizza, burgers) at lunchtime and/or dinner. The intent is to take further 'share of throat' from beer and wine.




Exhibit 1: Three-Stage Approach to Campari's Brand-Building Growth Strategy

Source: Campari Group Presentation 2017 (Accessed April 2020)

Sourcing Volume from Beer and Wine

Despite incredible growth over the last 15 years (+19.6% volume CAGR 2003-18), we do not think that Aperol will reach saturation anytime soon and believe **the brand has barely scratched the surface of its huge global growth potential**.

Aperol Spritz competes mainly with beer and wine which makes the addressable market very large. As per the company, ~67% of the growth comes from beer and the rest from wine. Aperol possesses several attributes underpinning further market penetration and 'share of throat' gain.

- 1. Aperol is a classic Italian bitter aperitif, a sub-category which has been surging in popularity, driven by consumers' disaffection for sweet cocktails underpinned by growing trends of health and wellness. Aperol Spritz's notes of herbaceous bitterness, eye-popping shade, and aspirational image make it stand out against beer and wine.
- 2. Aperol's lower level of alcohol by volume (ABV) than wine and spirits/cocktails also fits a trend towards moderation which is partly fuelled by young people wanting to stay more in control and having a keen awareness of their social media image.
- 3. The price point of Aperol Spritz is 10-20% lower than wine and spirits/cocktails as it typically contains less alcohol. This is advantageous for young adults who still want to drink and socialise but often live in large cities where the cost of living is continuously rising and may have less disposable income to spend on social drinking.



Exhibit 2: Capturing 'Share of Throat' from Beer and Wine

Source: Campari Group Presentations (Accessed April 2020)

Local Approach Fueling Global Expansion

We estimate that ~52m litres of Aperol were sold in 2019, generating €337m of sales. The company could continue to grow volume at ~18% p.a. over the next five years as the brand is still in the early innings of activation in large seeding and high potential markets such as the US, France, the UK, and Russia (fourth-largest market in value), and with per-capita consumption (PCC) at a fraction of established markets.

In the US, Aperol has grown at an average ~50% in value over the last three years. It is now Aperol's third biggest market by value and the fifth largest by volume with per capita consumption of only ~0.005L. After a seeding and activation phase in large East & West Coasts cities (NYC, LA, SF, Miami), the brand is beginning to penetrate both the on and off-premise, while initial activations in the mid-west (Chicago) took place in 2019.

We see the US market reaching ~9m litres by 2023 (~40% CAGR). This means per capita consumption would be ~0.03L, a level close to where markets such as France and Australia are today but still a fraction of Italy and Austria.

Seeding markets such as Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, and LatAm (Brazil in particular) will fuel the volume growth engine at high-double digit rate, although from a low base. In five years, most of these markets will still display double-digit growth rates as they move from the seeding stage to high-potential markets.

The company is also looking to engage in exploratory initiatives in China (initially planned in 2020) after some very successful first-time activations in Shanghai in the summer of 2019. This is potentially an enormous opportunity for the next decade. A per capita consumption level of 0.005L (today's US level) by 2023 would bring ~8m litres or +17% on current group level of 52m litres.

In the meantime, we expect **established markets** (Italy, Germany, Austria) to continue growing at low- to mid-single digits, driven by higher frequency consumption through de-seasonalisation and extension of usage occasions. These markets have increased volumes at 8.9% p.a. from 2015 to 2018 with Italy still growing sales at mid-double digit (+15% in 2018; +13% in 2019).

We see Aperol volume growth as being of better quality as it becomes less dependent on a few established markets. In 2018, 68% of volumes came from established markets, 20% from high-potential markets, and 12% from seeding markets. This compares to 90%, 6%, and 2% respectively in 2013.

The potential addressable market for Aperol is huge but a scattergun approach is highly unlikely. We expect management to stick to its patient model, taking time to understand the local consumers and tweaking its marketing approach along the way.

| | | Liter per | Volume (m litres, | Per Capita | Consump | tion CAGR | Liter per capita | Volume (m litres, | Volume CAGR |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------|----------------------|------------|---|-----------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Country | Market stage | (2018) | 2018) | 2012-18 | 2016-18 | 2018-23e | (2023e) | 2023e) | 18-23e |
| Italy | Core Established | 0.27 | 16.4 | 5% | 8% | 3% | 0.31 | 19.0 | 3% |
| Germany | Core Established | 0.08 | 6.6 | 4% | (11%) | 3% | 0.09 | 8.1 | 4% |
| Austria | Core Established | 0.20 | 1.8 | 15% | | 2% | 0.22 | 2.0 | 3% |
| US | High Potential | 0.005 | 1.6 | 33% | 58% | 39% | 0.03 | 8.8 | 40% |
| Australia | High Potential | 0.03 | 0.7 | 48% | 22% | 23% | 0.09 | 2.3 | 25% |
| France | High Potential | 0.03 | 2.3 | na | 29% | 25% | 0.10 | 6.9 | 25% |
| UK | High Potential | 0.02 | 1.3 | 70% | 41% | 24% | 0.06 | 4.0 | 25% |
| Others | Seeding / High potentia | al | 13.3 | | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | | | 48.8 | 30% |
| Volume (m litr | res) | | 44.0 | | | | | 99.8 | 18% |
| Estimated av | erage price (€/litre) | | €6.3 | | | | | € 7.2 | 3% |
| Revenue (€m) | | | 279 | | | | | 720 | 21% |
| Gross margin | (est.) | | 72% | | | | | 74% | |
| Gross profit (€ | m) | | 201 | | | | | 533 | 22% |

Exhibit 3: Aperol Has Barely Scratched the Surface of Its Huge Global Growth Potential

Source: Campari Group Presentations (Accessed April 2020), The Analyst Estimates (Completed April 2020)

On a 10-year view, Aperol global volume could be \sim 4x higher than today, reaching close to 200m litres; this is potentially a \sim €1.7bn sales brand generating \sim 75% gross margin by the end of the decade, adding \sim €1bn of profit.

04 May 2020

THE ANALYST


Exhibit 4: Longer-Term, Aperol Could Add ~€1bn of Profit to the Group

| | Est. 10 year | Volume CAGR | Liter per capita | Volume |
|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Country | volume growth | 23-28e | (2028e) | (m litres, 2028e) |
| Italy | 3% | 3% | 0.36 | 22 |
| Germany | 3% | 2% | 0.10 | 9 |
| Austria | 3% | 3% | 0.24 | 2 |
| US | 25% | 12% | 0.04 | 15 |
| Australia | 20% | 15% | 0.16 | 5 |
| France | 20% | 15% | 0.20 | 14 |
| UK | 20% | 15% | 0.11 | 8 |
| Others | 25% | 21% | - | 124 |
| Total | 16% | 15% | | 199 |
| Estimated average p | orice (€/litre) | | | € 8.5 |
| Revenue (€m) | | | | 1,694 |
| Gross margin (est.) | | | | 75% |
| Gross profit (€m) | | | | 1,271 |

Source: The Analyst Estimates (Completed April 2020)

Exhibit 5: Google Searches for Aperol Spritz in Key High Potential and Seeding Markets





Source: Google Trends (Accessed April 2020)



Growth Is Highly Accretive to Profitability

Based on our previous conversations with the company, we understand that Aperol gross margins are above 70%, which is higher than group gross margins of 60.9%. US gross margins are >80% (US retail price is 2-3x that of Italy). Australia and UK prices are higher than in Italy, whilst South America is cheaper. Italy, France, Spain, and Germany are broadly priced in line. This is important as the explosive growth in new markets drives higher pricing and gross margins.

Aperol is 18% of group sales FY'19 with an estimated gross profit contribution of \sim 22%. We estimate that the brand will represent 30% of group sales by FY'23e contributing \sim 35% of total gross profit.

In addition, we see the premiumisation of the some of the other high-growth Global Priority brands (e.g. Wild Turkey, Jamaican Rums) as another potential driver of gross margin accretion (see below).




Exhibit 6: Aperol Growth Is Highly Accretive to Group Gross Margin

Source: Campari Group Annual Reports (Accessed April 2020)

Other Brands: A Balanced Cocktail of Future Growth Optionality

While the performance of other brands has been a bit of a mixed bag, a lot of the portfolio alignment has already been implemented and we see some of the brand-building efforts starting to pay off. We think the **growth optionality embedded in some of these brands is potentially overlooked by the market**.

We expect the overall growth of the Global Priorities portfolio (~40% of group sales ex-Aperol) to accelerate driven by 1) a continuation of **supporting underlying trends in core markets** (e.g. classic cocktails revival, premiumisation) and 2) **internationalisation opportunities**. Additionally, we expect some positive effect on gross margins driven by the **increasing premiumisation positioning** of high-growth key brands such as Wild Turkey and Appleton Estate.


- Campari's organic sales growth has averaged 9.1% over the last 5 years (2/3 volumes, 1/3 price) although, growth has decelerated to ~5% in the last two years, due to volume decline in Argentina (a large market for the brand) and destocking effect in Japan ahead of a change to route to market (FY'19). Nevertheless, the brand continues benefitting from a very solid underlying global trend of classic cocktails. In the US (second largest market in value), the brand's organic sales growth has averaged 16% over the last three years supported by the revival of Campari-based classic cocktails and speakeasy-style mixology (in particular the Negroni, Americano, and Boulevardier). Also, the company indicates that off-trade consumption is increasing. We have the Campari brand growing at ~4% CAGR 2019-23e.
- SKYY Vodka has been a drag on the company's growth due to significant decline in the US (~73% of sales value) driven by unfavourable trends in the core vodka segment where consumers taste is shifting from sweet-favoured products to handmade and botanical vodkas. The decline has decelerated, helped by the company's marketing efforts to keep the



brand premium and relevant among millennial consumers. The end of the destocking cycle in the US should support some level of stabilisation while it remains to be seen if international can gather further momentum. We have conservatively modelled sales CAGR of -1.1% in FY'19-'23e.

- Wild Turkey, a higher margin product, has steady mid-single-digit organic sales growth. The brand growth should continue to be driven by the premium extensions of the Wild Turkey portfolio (Longbranch Bourbon, Russell's Reserve), leveraging on the brand heritage and celebrity endorsements. Growth in premium product offerings also provides some level of margin accretion at the group level, although the US-centric positioning of the product could limit a significant global expansion.
- Grand Marnier, acquired in 2016, has so far, displayed some mixed performance. The brand is being repositioned with a focus on cocktails and mixologists for its core product and a push into the premium/super-premium segments leveraging on the brand heritage. While it has gathered some tractions in the US (largest market in value), in Europe, the brand still needs to be transformed from being a gastronomy brand (i.e. used for cakes) into a cocktail brand. We estimate that the brand can grow at low-to-mid-single-digit in the next 3-5 years.
- The Jamaican Rums portfolio has delivered solid organic growth thanks to its key brands Wray and Nephew Overproof and Appleton Estate.
 - Wray and Nephew Overproof, a white rum, has been growing at 12-15% p.a. over the last three years as it continues to be one of mixologists' favourite. In the UK, the brand is benefiting from consumers upgrading to more expensive rums. As per IWSR, in the UK, premium-and-above rum segments have seen volumes soar by more than 140% in just five years and these higher-end rums now make up just shy of 10% of the market.
 - With Appleton Estate, the group is building a portfolio of premium and aged dark rums and is set to leverage the upcoming premiumisation trend of rums. In the latest Bacardi 2020 Cocktail Trends Report, 43% of bartenders globally voted dark rum as the top spirit to premiumise.
- In July 2019, the group acquired three French premium rum brands providing access to a growing rum market (IWSR reports that premium plus rums are gaining share in France with volume increasing 28% in 2019) and adding critical mass to a strategic market for Aperol and Campari.





Source: IWSR, Inside the Cask (Accessed April 2020)

The **Regional Priority Brands** portfolio is growing at ~4% and is lower gross margin.

• Espolon has been fast-growing with an average organic growth of ~38% over the last five years. As a high-end tequila brand, it has been benefitting from an explosion of the category in the US driven by a switch from cheaper mixed varieties to 100% pure agave Mexican products. However, the boom has spurred continuous inflation in agave prices which has negatively impacted gross margin at the group level (30bps in FY'19; ~€6m).



• The brand's premium positioning provides some expansion potential beyond the US market on the back of the global cocktail trends. Seeding markets such as Australia, Canada and Italy have shown positive momentum. We think the brand has the potential to reach ~€140m in sales by FY'23e versus ~€70m today (FY'19).

Local Priorities and the rest of the portfolio are growing at low to mid-single-digit rate and are lower gross margins. They include RTDs, liquors, and sparkling wines which Campari plans to keep as these provide access into local markets such as Russia and Brazil.




Exhibit 8: Campari Group Provides Premium Spirits for Each of the Top 10 Cocktails in the World

Source: Campari Group Annual Reports, Campari Group Presentation 2018 (Accessed April 2020)

COVID-19 Crisis Impact

Campari Group is certainly not immune from the impact of current COVID-19 crisis, given its brands' bias towards on-trade, the aperitifs segment, and social gatherings. The share price is already down ~25% since its pre-crisis peak.

The group limited exposure to Asia (7% of group sales but 2.2% excluding Australia) and the global retail travel channel (1.6% of group sales) should mitigate the impact on Q1'20 sales, but the first quarter is generally only \sim 20% of total sales.

We expect Q2'20 (~25% of total sales) to be much more impacted as most of Europe and the Americas entered some form of lockdown in mid-/end-March. As the world slowly comes out of the lockdown, Q3 and Q4 FY'20 (~25% and ~30% of total sales, respectively) to be somewhat less impacted with possibly some catch-up in Q4.

Overall, we estimate revenue to decline by \sim 5% and adj. EBIT by \sim 8% in FY'20e with A&P flexibility acting as potential mitigating factors to negative operating leverage. EPS increases by 3% in FY'20 supported by the announced share buyback.

On 27 March 2020, the company has confirmed that the dividend payment of $\leq 63m$ and $\leq 350m$ will be returned to shareholders in 2020 through a share buyback programme. As a result, we see leverage going from 1.6x in FY'19 to 2.0x in FY'20e.



Campari Group has €581m of bond maturing on 30 September 2020. As of 31 December 2019, the group had cash equivalents of €704m as well as existing undrawn credit lines of €500m. It has recently announced a new €750m term debt facility. The Group confirms the absence of any financial covenant on the outstanding debt.

Valuation

We estimate group revenue growth at ~6.6% CAGR 2019-23e driven by ~21% at Aperol and ~3.5% for the rest of the portfolio. Gross margin increases from 60.9% in FY'19 to 62.5% in FY'23e. The gross margin accretion of 165bps is relatively modest as we expect a 90bps gross margin impact on FY'20e. From FY'21e to FY'23e, we forecast 75-100 bps margin accretion per annum (the company guides to 100-120 bps).

We estimate adjusted EBIT to reach ~€575m by FY'23e, with margins increasing from 22.1% in FY'19 to 24.2% in FY'23e. We have assumed a moderate operating leverage effect on fixed costs with A&P increasing in line with the top line at 6.1% CAGR 19-23e and overhead at 5.2% CAGR 19-23e.

We expect Campari Group to generate ~€0.6bn of free cash flow after earn-outs in 2020-22e. We have not factored in any M&A, although we note the current negotiations to acquire 80% of the owner of the champagne brand Lallier. At this stage, we have assumed an additional €350m share buyback in FY'22e with the company maintaining a ND/EBITDA of 1.9x.

As a result, adj. EPS is expected to grow at ~14% CAGR from FY'19 to FY'23e. We value Campari Group on 30x forward P/E FY'23e, in line with the last three years' average (five-year average at 27x). Adding two years of dividends provides a target price of €11.6, implying a total return of ~66%.




Exhibit 9: Campari Valuation and Historical P/E Multiples

Source: The Analyst Estimates (Completed April 2020), Bloomberg (Accessed April 2020)

Conclusion

Campari Group combines a lot of the characteristics of a great business. Growth can accelerate as Aperol has only scratched the surface of its global potential and the other key brands in the portfolio have some significant growth optionality. The stock is down ~25% since its pre-COVID-19 peak and the current uncertainty offers a good opportunity to build up a position for the long-term in one of the best-run business in Europe. Therefore, we initiate with a Buy recommendation and a €11.59 target price, offering ~66% upside.



Important Information and Disclaimers

The accompanying documents have been prepared and issued by The Analyst Research LLP ("The Analyst"). This research is confidential and is intended only for use by persons to whom it has been directly distributed by The Analyst. This research is strictly confidential and must not be distributed to any third party by the recipient named in the watermark.

The Analyst is a limited liability partnership authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") of the United Kingdom (firm reference number 605593) and registered as an investment adviser in the United States of America by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (registration number 801-76777). Registered office: Arthur House, Chorlton Street, Manchester, M1 3FH. Trading address: 35 Bedford Road, London, SW4 7EF.

THE ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS ARE MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS. The documents are not independent investment research and have not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research and, in producing these documents, The Analyst is not, and has not been, subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of these documents.

The accompanying documents are intended only to promote the investment research and related advisory services of The Analyst, by using examples and case-studies to give potential clients of The Analyst a sample of The Analyst's investment research services and how such services will be provided. The examples used may be actual investment research issued previously and/or research in relation to hypothetical situations.

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING, THESE MARKETING DOCUMENTS DO NOT RECOMMEND OR SUGGEST ANY INVESTMENT STRATEGY, DO NOT CONSTITUTE INVESTMENT ADVICE AND MUST NOT BE TREATED AS DOING SO BY RECIPIENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT.

The accompanying documents are issued by The Analyst only to and/or are directed only at (and The Analyst's services will be made available only to) persons who are "professional clients" or "eligible counterparties" (as defined in the rules of the FCA). Persons of any other description (including, without limitation, persons who are "retail clients" for the purposes of the FCA Rules) must not act or rely on this material, and the services of The Analyst will not be available to such persons.

All content within these marketing documents (including text, trademarks, illustrations, photographs, graphics, designs, arrangements etc.) are protected by copyright and other protective laws. The marketing documents should not be passed on, duplicated nor reproduced in whole or in part under any circumstances without The Analyst's express written consent.

The information in the accompanying documents is provided for information purposes only and is not comprehensive. These accompanying documents are not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation which would subject The Analyst to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. The financial instruments described in these accompanying documents research may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to certain categories of investors.

The Analyst gives no undertaking that it will update any of the information, data and opinions in this document. The Analyst may at its discretion decide to provide you with further data or material but makes no representation that such further data or material will be calculated or produced on the same basis, or in the same format, as this material.

The Analyst's methodology for determining valuations and price targets may include, but are not restricted to, the following methodologies: analyses of market risk, growth rate, revenue stream, discounted cash flow ("DCF"), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation ("EBITDA"), earnings per share ("EPS"), cash flow ("CF"), free cash flow ("FCF"), enterprise value ("EV")/EBITDA, price-earnings ratio ("PE"), PE/growth, price/CF, price/FCF, premium (discount)/average group EV/EBITDA, premium (discount)/average group PE, sum-of-the-parts ("SOTP"), net asset value ("NAV"), dividend returns and return on equity ("ROE").

The investments described in the accompanying documents place an investor's capital at risk (i.e. an investor might lose some or all of the amount invested). Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance and an investor may not get back the amount originally invested. The price, value of, and income from, any of the financial instruments mentioned can rise as well as fall and may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors. The accompanying documents do not seek to provide an exhaustive statement of the risks associated with the investments or types of investments referred to. All information is provided AS IS with no warranties and confers no rights. If a financial instrument is denominated in a currency other than the investor's home currency, a change in exchange rates may adversely affect the price of, value of, or income derived from the financial instrument described in this report. In addition, investors in securities such as American Depositary Receipts ("ADR"s), whose values are affected by the currency of the underlying security, effectively assume currency risk. Please note that in particular the bases and levels of taxation may change.

Any prices stated in this research are for information purposes only and do not represent valuations for individual securities or other instruments. There is no representation that any transaction can or could have been affected at those prices. Different assumptions, made by The Analyst or any other source, may yield substantially different results. The accompanying documents are intended to be for information and marketing purposes only and are not intended to constitute, and should not be construed as, investment advice. These documents have no regard for the specific investment objectives, financial situation or needs of any person. Recipients of these documents should seek their own independent financial advice. They are not and should not be construed as a recommendation, offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument.

No liability is accepted by The Analyst for the reliability, accuracy or completeness of such information. In no event will The Analyst be liable to any person for any direct, indirect, special or consequential losses or damages of any kind arising out of any use of or reliance on the information in the accompanying documents, including without limitation, any loss of profit, business interruption, loss of programs or data on your equipment or otherwise. This does not exclude or restrict any duty or liability that The Analyst has to its customers under the relevant regulatory systems.